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<p>So far, the peer disagreement literature has focused on determining the rational response to the discovery that a peer disagrees with you. I think we should also focus on determining the <i>moral</i> response to peer disagreement. I provide two fully distinct arguments for the conclusion that we have moral reason to conciliate with our peer. First, I demonstrate that we have a moral duty, on pain of disrespect, to factor in the higher-order evidence of our peer’s reliability and the fact of peer disagreement. Factoring this in will often result in at least some conciliation. Second, I argue that practicing the moral virtue of open-mindedness rationally requires lowering confidence. And while there is no moral <i>duty</i> to be open-minded, it is on balance morally <i>preferable</i> to be open-minded, particularly in cases (like peer disagreement) where you have no epistemic reason to suspect that being open-minded will lead you astray. I close by explaining the ramifications of my claim for the relationship between moral and epistemic norms.</p>

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Moral norms on peer disagreement

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年11月5日

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  • Ripley Stroud

摘要

So far, the peer disagreement literature has focused on determining the rational response to the discovery that a peer disagrees with you. I think we should also focus on determining the moral response to peer disagreement. I provide two fully distinct arguments for the conclusion that we have moral reason to conciliate with our peer. First, I demonstrate that we have a moral duty, on pain of disrespect, to factor in the higher-order evidence of our peer’s reliability and the fact of peer disagreement. Factoring this in will often result in at least some conciliation. Second, I argue that practicing the moral virtue of open-mindedness rationally requires lowering confidence. And while there is no moral duty to be open-minded, it is on balance morally preferable to be open-minded, particularly in cases (like peer disagreement) where you have no epistemic reason to suspect that being open-minded will lead you astray. I close by explaining the ramifications of my claim for the relationship between moral and epistemic norms.