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<p>Some hinge epistemologists have identified the constraints of innate and hardwired cognitive capacities with hinge propositions. My point in this paper is that they have focused only on one part of the story offered by developmental psychology. Another part, addressed here, predicts that cognitive constraints have the potential to be conceptually bootstrapped. The claim is that conceptual bootstrapping provides the subject with rational support for hinge propositions, contrary to the mainstream view in hinge epistemology. First, I introduce the basics of conceptual bootstrapping (§2). Next, I argue that conceptual bootstrapping provides the subject with rational support for hinge commitments (§&#xa0;3). §§&#xa0;4–6 addresses a possible objections to my proposal. §7 concludes.</p>

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Conceptual and epistemic bootstrapping of hinge commitments

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  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年9月24日

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  • Paweł Grad

摘要

Some hinge epistemologists have identified the constraints of innate and hardwired cognitive capacities with hinge propositions. My point in this paper is that they have focused only on one part of the story offered by developmental psychology. Another part, addressed here, predicts that cognitive constraints have the potential to be conceptually bootstrapped. The claim is that conceptual bootstrapping provides the subject with rational support for hinge propositions, contrary to the mainstream view in hinge epistemology. First, I introduce the basics of conceptual bootstrapping (§2). Next, I argue that conceptual bootstrapping provides the subject with rational support for hinge commitments (§ 3). §§ 4–6 addresses a possible objections to my proposal. §7 concludes.