<p>This paper outlines and defends a disjunctive neo-Humean account of action. It seeks to unify and elucidate actions stemming from many disparate causal pathways by relating them to well-understood central, or paradigmatic, cases of action. This also allows the view to deal with many objections to the default version of the Humean theory of motivation (<i>HTM</i>) and be metaethically fruitful. The paper first sets out actions that stem from appropriately combined beliefs and pro-attitudes, as per <i>HTM</i>, as features of a central, paradigmatic kind of action. This kind of action involves causing bodily movement events with appropriately combined belief/pro-attitude-pairs: in other words, manifesting these agential abilities. Then kinds of action that involve <i>more</i> than beliefs and pro-attitudes can be accommodated as approximating actions <i>par excellence</i> based on beliefs, pro-attitudes, and additional features. These include actions based on things like irreducible intentions, structural rationality, and the ability to act for normative reasons. Furthermore, kinds of action that involve <i>less</i> than belief/pro-attitude-pairs can be accommodated as they make lesser use of the agential abilities involved in the paradigmatic kind of action. These include actions without movement, actions out of pro-attitudes, and sub-intentional actions – and we can accommodate various kinds of failed actions similarly.</p>