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<p>A number of problems motivate research in so-called hinge epistemology. Two of these concern questions about the nature of hinges as foundations or presuppositions that underpin our practical and theoretical justification at a collective level, as well as about the dynamics between different types of hinges that regulate our practices, such as global and local hinges (Moyal-Sharrock, <i>Understanding Wittgenstein’s on Certainty</i> Understanding Wittgenstein’s on certainty, 2004). In turn, group epistemology also focuses on some disputes about the nature of collective epistemic justification (Pettit, <i>Philosophical Issues</i> <i>11</i>, Philosophical Issues 11 (1): 268–299, 2001; List, <i>Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents</i> Group agency: The possibility, design, and status of corporate agents, 2011) and the character of group epistemic properties that are not reducible to individual properties (Gilbert, <i>Synthese</i> <i>73</i>, Synthese 73:(1), 185–204, 1987, Gilbert, <i>On Social Facts</i> On social facts, 1992, Tuomela, <i>Episteme</i> <i>1</i>, Episteme 1: (2), 109–127, 2004, Tollefsen, <i>Review of Philosophy and Psychology</i> <i>4</i>, Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4: (1), 49–64, 2013, 2023; Palermos, 2016; Palermos &amp; Pritchard, Social epistemology and Epistemic Agency: De-centralizing Epistemic Agency (pp. 109–126), 2016). In this paper, we propose a new approach to addressing both sets of problems by integrating insights from each framework. We argue that hinges share dominance with distinctive features of group epistemology, motivating a novel hypothesis about their epistemic role.</p>

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Group hinge epistemology

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年11月5日

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  • Ignacio Gómez-Ledo,
  • Dani Pino

摘要

A number of problems motivate research in so-called hinge epistemology. Two of these concern questions about the nature of hinges as foundations or presuppositions that underpin our practical and theoretical justification at a collective level, as well as about the dynamics between different types of hinges that regulate our practices, such as global and local hinges (Moyal-Sharrock, Understanding Wittgenstein’s on Certainty Understanding Wittgenstein’s on certainty, 2004). In turn, group epistemology also focuses on some disputes about the nature of collective epistemic justification (Pettit, Philosophical Issues 11, Philosophical Issues 11 (1): 268–299, 2001; List, Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents Group agency: The possibility, design, and status of corporate agents, 2011) and the character of group epistemic properties that are not reducible to individual properties (Gilbert, Synthese 73, Synthese 73:(1), 185–204, 1987, Gilbert, On Social Facts On social facts, 1992, Tuomela, Episteme 1, Episteme 1: (2), 109–127, 2004, Tollefsen, Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4, Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4: (1), 49–64, 2013, 2023; Palermos, 2016; Palermos & Pritchard, Social epistemology and Epistemic Agency: De-centralizing Epistemic Agency (pp. 109–126), 2016). In this paper, we propose a new approach to addressing both sets of problems by integrating insights from each framework. We argue that hinges share dominance with distinctive features of group epistemology, motivating a novel hypothesis about their epistemic role.