<p>I argue that generic generalizations expressed in language (hereafter “generics”) are not to blame in cases of prejudicial reasoning and treatment that involve them. I introduce four cases in which generics based plausibly on genetic associations (i.e., “genetic generics,” which are prima facie most susceptible to essentialism in that they suggest an inherent cause of a property or effect) serve as motivation for prejudicial behavior. I then argue for three claims. First, I argue that generics do not rationally license corresponding essentialist beliefs. Second, I argue that we ought to mediate cognitive biases and heuristics like essentialism (i.e., revise unjustified false beliefs that arise from essentialism). Third, I argue that genetic generics, even if true, don’t account for the (problematic) actions in the cases that seem to be motivated by them. In other words, I vindicate generics by granting that even if seemingly problematic generics turn out to be true, prejudicial treatment does not correctly follow from or depend upon them, especially because essentialist beliefs also do not. I conclude by discussing some of the real-world implications of my argument for the use of generics, both in communication with children, who may not be reasonably expected to meet certain norms of reasoning, and for achieving other ends than those that genetic generics may initially be thought to suggest.</p>