<p>Current discussions on the relationship between group knowledge and the mental states of individual members in group epistemology remain controversial, particularly in terms of clarifying the exact roles of human and nonhuman agents in generating group knowledge. By critically examining existing theories, this article innovatively proposes a “human-nonhuman continuum” to compare diverse theoretical perspectives systematically, aiming to clarify the functional roles of human and nonhuman elements within group epistemic processes, identifying an optimal theoretical balance point. The core argument of this study is that a group, G, can know that p, even if no individual member knows or is aware of p, provided that G possesses a proper epistemic structure. Specifically, this paper formulates a meta-epistemic structure required for group knowing emphasizes that group actors must access the group’s information integration system and explicitly argues that the epistemic operative members in the group must function to ensure such accessibility. The proposed account elucidates the crucial role of human agents in knowledge generation, alongside the growing autonomy and importance of nonhuman elements. It also offers cogent explanations and mechanisms for responsibility allocation when discrepancies arise between group knowledge and actions.</p>