<p>I explore the metaphysical distinction between real and non-real kinds, rejecting the traditional Mind-Independence Criterion for realism about kinds. I propose an alternative criterion for real kinds: Representational Independence of Causal Powers (RICP). According to RICP, a kind is real if its causal powers are independent of the causal powers of representations of that kind. This approach addresses two puzzles: why mind-dependent kinds of successful sciences, like psychology and social science, can still be real, and why mind-dependent kinds such as fairies or phlogiston are non-real. The paper argues that real kinds are those that have causal powers grounded in actual instances in the world, even if those kinds and their instances are mind-dependent. In contrast, bogus kinds are those whose explanatory power arises from the representations themselves, rather than real causal patterns. I further examine complications posed by artificial kinds, conventional kinds, interactive kinds, and “mismatch kinds”. Ultimately, I present a causal-oriented framework for understanding realism about mental and social kinds.</p>