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<p>There is a growing body of evidence that the mentalizing abilities of humans and other primates have a “knowledge-first” character, according to which the ability to appreciate others’ knowledge is more basic than the ability to appreciate others’ beliefs. This paper proposes an overlooked way of understanding the knowledge-first character of mentalizing and develops a particular model along those lines. I motivate the model by comparing it to alternatives and explain how, if the model is correct, then the step some have made, from the evidence for knowledge-first mentalizing to more theoretical claims about the relative basicness of knowledge and belief (or the concepts thereof), is not motivated.</p>

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Knowledge-first mentalizing: concept-based or merely state-based?

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年9月4日

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  • Rory Harder

摘要

There is a growing body of evidence that the mentalizing abilities of humans and other primates have a “knowledge-first” character, according to which the ability to appreciate others’ knowledge is more basic than the ability to appreciate others’ beliefs. This paper proposes an overlooked way of understanding the knowledge-first character of mentalizing and develops a particular model along those lines. I motivate the model by comparing it to alternatives and explain how, if the model is correct, then the step some have made, from the evidence for knowledge-first mentalizing to more theoretical claims about the relative basicness of knowledge and belief (or the concepts thereof), is not motivated.