<p>The paper situates Heidegger’s account of authentic belief within debates on the ethics of belief. After outlining the Heideggerian notion of authentic belief, it examines two apparently opposed interpretations developed in the literature: Dreyfus’s view that authentic belief gains its intelligibility solely from the shared social world, and Crowell’s view that authenticity hinges on the believer’s first-person ownership. The paper argues that each interpretation risks collapsing into moral relativism and, to avoid this pitfall, proposes an alternative reading of authentic belief that integrates the insights of both views.</p>

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Belief, responsibility, and authenticity: reframing Heidegger’s existential ethics

  • Ying Lan

摘要

The paper situates Heidegger’s account of authentic belief within debates on the ethics of belief. After outlining the Heideggerian notion of authentic belief, it examines two apparently opposed interpretations developed in the literature: Dreyfus’s view that authentic belief gains its intelligibility solely from the shared social world, and Crowell’s view that authenticity hinges on the believer’s first-person ownership. The paper argues that each interpretation risks collapsing into moral relativism and, to avoid this pitfall, proposes an alternative reading of authentic belief that integrates the insights of both views.