<p>Conceptual ethics asks which concepts we ought to use. Matthieu Queloz’s recent book, <i>The Ethics of Conceptualization</i>, offers the most developed account to date. He argues that reasons for concept choice should be grounded in our conceptual needs, which he understands as reflectively endorsed concerns, capacities, and circumstances. His case proceeds through a two-tier argument that rejects foundationalism, ironism, and holism, as well as approaches that rely exclusively on epistemic or theoretical virtues. We argue that Queloz’s dismissal of foundationalism is too quick. By relating his framework to the familiar distinction between applied, normative, and meta-ethics, we clarify the meta-ethical commitments implicit in his position. This, in turn, allows us to extract four desiderata that any plausible theory of conceptual ethics must meet: Non-Arbitrary Authority, Comprehensive Value Sensitivity, Context-Sensitivity, and Compatibility with the Modern World. We develop and defend an alternative foundationalist view that meets all four desiderata and avoids the objections Queloz levels against traditional foundationalism. This “proper foundationalism” grounds reasons for concept choice in objective values without assuming that all concepts must track metaphysical structure. The disagreement between Queloz and his foundationalist rivals, we argue, is best understood as a dispute within meta-ethics. Recognizing this clarifies the structure of conceptual ethics and expands the theoretical options available for guiding conceptual improvement.</p>