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<p>Nomic essentialism is the surprising view that particulars and their properties are importantly dependent on laws. In this paper, I consider what I call a <i>moderate nomic essentialist</i> reading of Kant, on which the thesis of dependence on law is restricted to empirical objects. I argue that this reading is more plausible than it might seem, and can be textually motivated by the relational character of empirical objects, the role of laws in determinism, and Kant’s laws-first account of what it is to be a material particular. I also compare this reading with more familiar contemporary arguments for nomic essentialism. Finally, I consider two problems for nomic essentialism—the problem of circularity and the problem of nomic governance—and outline some possible responses on Kant’s behalf.</p>

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Laws first: Kant as a nomic essentialist

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年9月10日

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  • Aaron Wells

摘要

Nomic essentialism is the surprising view that particulars and their properties are importantly dependent on laws. In this paper, I consider what I call a moderate nomic essentialist reading of Kant, on which the thesis of dependence on law is restricted to empirical objects. I argue that this reading is more plausible than it might seem, and can be textually motivated by the relational character of empirical objects, the role of laws in determinism, and Kant’s laws-first account of what it is to be a material particular. I also compare this reading with more familiar contemporary arguments for nomic essentialism. Finally, I consider two problems for nomic essentialism—the problem of circularity and the problem of nomic governance—and outline some possible responses on Kant’s behalf.