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<p>When can you rationally resist misleading evidence? One influential answer appeals to the idea that knowledge can serve as a safeguarding instrument, which, if not allowing you to outright dismiss misleading evidence—as Kripke’s dogmatism paradox suggests—at least makes it more likely that your true beliefs rationally resist defeat (Williamson, <CitationRef CitationID="CR23">2000</CitationRef>). I reject the idea, arguing that any such rational resistance is well accounted for by our beliefs, regardless of whether they amount to knowledge. By paying attention to how evidential strength influences the <i>resilience</i> of rational belief, I offer an evidential account of rational resistance. I use the account to evaluate Harman’s solution to Kripke’s dogmatism paradox, highlighting the limits of the knowledge-based approach.</p>

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Resisting counterevidence: no knowledge needed

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年7月11日

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  • Jakob Donskov

摘要

When can you rationally resist misleading evidence? One influential answer appeals to the idea that knowledge can serve as a safeguarding instrument, which, if not allowing you to outright dismiss misleading evidence—as Kripke’s dogmatism paradox suggests—at least makes it more likely that your true beliefs rationally resist defeat (Williamson, 2000). I reject the idea, arguing that any such rational resistance is well accounted for by our beliefs, regardless of whether they amount to knowledge. By paying attention to how evidential strength influences the resilience of rational belief, I offer an evidential account of rational resistance. I use the account to evaluate Harman’s solution to Kripke’s dogmatism paradox, highlighting the limits of the knowledge-based approach.