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<p>A minimal realist thinks we are justified in believing in unobservable entities as explanatory, but we should be cautious in allowing non-empirically justified entities in our ontology. In this paper I argue that a minimalist would find my proposal for an ontology of fundamental entities without fundamental properties the best balance between empirical adequacy, explanatory power, and physical justification.</p>

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A minimal metaphysics of thin-objects and nomic structure

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年7月30日

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  • Valia Allori

摘要

A minimal realist thinks we are justified in believing in unobservable entities as explanatory, but we should be cautious in allowing non-empirically justified entities in our ontology. In this paper I argue that a minimalist would find my proposal for an ontology of fundamental entities without fundamental properties the best balance between empirical adequacy, explanatory power, and physical justification.