<p>In this paper we argue that we have reason to use epistemic nudges to correct for biases influencing perceptions of normative expectations. There is a broad consensus in the literature on social norms that individuals’ normative behaviours are fundamentally conditional on normative (and empirical) expectations. Expectations are a sub-set of beliefs, hence normative expectations have an epistemic aspect. Our paper focuses on normative expectation which refers to an individual’s second-order belief about what most other people in her community believe she ought to do. Normative expectations can be influenced by various forms of bias which can lead individuals to overestimate or underestimate the prevalence or strength of certain norms in their community, or to conform to norms that do not provide social benefit. We propose using epistemic nudges to produce accurate normative expectations in those nudgees. We examine the sort of epistemic nudges that could do so by enabling better presentation and transparency of information.</p>