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<p>It is commonplace to have faith that democracy will win out in the end, or that a friend will pass her exam. But it seems odd to have faith that all vixens are female foxes, or that 2 + 2 = 4. This paper offers an account of why some propositions, but not others, can be objects for propositional faith. It outlines a range of theories that have been defended on this issue, but shows that each account faces straightforward counterexamples. The paper then proposes a new theory: that an agent can only have faith that <i>p</i> if she does not judge the truth of <i>p</i> to be irrefutable. This account is defended on the grounds that it makes better sense of a range of cases, that it follows from resilience – a constitutive property of faith – and that it fits within historically significant accounts of faith.</p>

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Faith and epistemic coherence

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年7月11日

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  • Finlay Malcolm

摘要

It is commonplace to have faith that democracy will win out in the end, or that a friend will pass her exam. But it seems odd to have faith that all vixens are female foxes, or that 2 + 2 = 4. This paper offers an account of why some propositions, but not others, can be objects for propositional faith. It outlines a range of theories that have been defended on this issue, but shows that each account faces straightforward counterexamples. The paper then proposes a new theory: that an agent can only have faith that p if she does not judge the truth of p to be irrefutable. This account is defended on the grounds that it makes better sense of a range of cases, that it follows from resilience – a constitutive property of faith – and that it fits within historically significant accounts of faith.