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<p>Recent interpretations of Kant’s metaphysics and philosophy of nature by Nicholas Stang and James Messina have ascribed to Kant the view that we can make substantive claims about noumenal forces. This article challenges these readings, as well as related dispositional essentialist interpretations of Kant that have been proposed by Messina and Michela Massimi. Kant’s theory of fundamental forces, the article argues, entails that we have no warrant to claim knowledge of the forces of things in themselves. Moreover, Kant’s position is far removed from some central tenets of dispositional essentialism.</p>

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Noumenal forces? Essences, things in themselves, and dispositions in Kant

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年6月23日

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  • Stephen Howard

摘要

Recent interpretations of Kant’s metaphysics and philosophy of nature by Nicholas Stang and James Messina have ascribed to Kant the view that we can make substantive claims about noumenal forces. This article challenges these readings, as well as related dispositional essentialist interpretations of Kant that have been proposed by Messina and Michela Massimi. Kant’s theory of fundamental forces, the article argues, entails that we have no warrant to claim knowledge of the forces of things in themselves. Moreover, Kant’s position is far removed from some central tenets of dispositional essentialism.