<p>According to realism about eliteness, there are certain features—typically, natural or joint-carving features—with which it’s objectively correct to theorize. Much metaphysical theorizing may implicitly assume eliteness, and some explicitly assumes it. Despite recent discussion of eliteness, however, there has been little consideration of the prospects for a defense of eliteness in light of recent work on epistemic value. I show how eliteness can be defended much like other normative claims, through both epistemic consequentialist and non-consequentialist explanations. These normative explanations are non-circular in form, given their appeal to fundamentally valuable features which don’t derive their value from any other source. Such explanations thereby allow a realist rejoinder to Dasgupta (The Philosophical Review 127(3):279–322, 2018), who argues that an explanation of why we should theorize with natural features can’t be both non-circular and grounded in objective facts. As a result, I argue that Dasgupta-style challenges don’t threaten eliteness unless we also reject normative realism.</p>