Artifact kinds have members—e.g., this and that chair—have normative properties—e.g., a chair is supposed to be sat upon—and they may change—e.g., pipe cleaners were used for cleaning smoking pipes, now they serve as craft materials (Carlson & Parsons, 2008). A theory of artifact kinds should therefore satisfy these desiderata (KIND MEMBERSHIP, NORMATIVITY, CHANGE). This paper aims to raise an alternative anti-essentialist account about artifact kinds that can satisfy the desiderata. I first explain the distinction between essentialism and anti-essentialism about artifacts, situating the proposed account in the anti-essentialist terrain. I then refine the pluralistic anti-essentialist account (PAA) by adopting Kendall Walton’s distinction between standard, contra-standard, and variable properties. By adopting Walton’s distinctions to all artifact kinds, I show that PAA can satisfy each desideratum.
