<p>This paper looks at the so-called “genealogical challenge”, encapsulated in the “you just believe that because …” (YJBTB) schema, through the lens of hinge epistemology. It is claimed that hinges are typically believed just because one has been brought up to believe them (§1). Yet, due to their extreme variability, it is not always the case that hinges are not rationally held, while fitting into the YJBTB schema. In particular, they are rationally held when either different (de facto empirical) hinges are taken for granted merely because of one’s position in history, or else when (de jure) hinges, constitutive of epistemic rationality, are plugged into the YJBTB schema. By contrast, they are not rationally held when different hinges are taken for granted while aware of the fact that one’s reasons for them are either question-begging or no stronger than the ones in favor of incompatible ones (§ §3–4). These would all be cases of “deep disagreement” – that is, disagreement that depends on different and incompatible hinges, which prevent parties from utilizing a common epistemic method or practice to rationally resolve the disagreement. Finally, we look at the possible extension of this framework to what may be regarded as religious and moral hinges. It is claimed that, depending on the hinge in question, these disagreements may (or may not) be “deep” (§5). Hence, looking at the genealogical challenge through the lens of hinge epistemology helps elucidate its nature, its epistemic significance and its scope.</p>