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<p>In this paper, I offer an anti-causalist response to positive arguments in favor of reductive causalism about inference. I consider two arguments, borrowed from the causal theory of action, for causalism about inference: the Argument from Normative Overdetermination, and the Argument from Intervention. I argue that the former is inadequate to establish causalism; in arguing against the latter, I show that causation is not a necessary part of the concept of inference.</p>

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A response to some arguments for causalism about inference

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年5月2日

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  • Laura Tomlinson Makin

摘要

In this paper, I offer an anti-causalist response to positive arguments in favor of reductive causalism about inference. I consider two arguments, borrowed from the causal theory of action, for causalism about inference: the Argument from Normative Overdetermination, and the Argument from Intervention. I argue that the former is inadequate to establish causalism; in arguing against the latter, I show that causation is not a necessary part of the concept of inference.