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<p>The main goal of this paper is to defend so-called <i>atomist</i> approaches to concept individuation against the threat presented by what I will refer to as <i>Frege’s Problem Psychologized</i> (FPP): difficulties presented by putative cases of co-referring but distinct concepts. The discussion will provide an opportunity to highlight the virtues of a particularly austere, reference-based version of Concept Atomism and to draw attention to some broader morals, notably that even a radical version of atomism is consistent with embracing various features of cognition that are of interest to psychologists and empirically oriented philosophers.</p>

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Frege’s problem psychologized, concept atomism, and the division of labor

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年4月22日

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  • Kevan Edwards

摘要

The main goal of this paper is to defend so-called atomist approaches to concept individuation against the threat presented by what I will refer to as Frege’s Problem Psychologized (FPP): difficulties presented by putative cases of co-referring but distinct concepts. The discussion will provide an opportunity to highlight the virtues of a particularly austere, reference-based version of Concept Atomism and to draw attention to some broader morals, notably that even a radical version of atomism is consistent with embracing various features of cognition that are of interest to psychologists and empirically oriented philosophers.