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<p>The popular idea that knowledge is the aim of inquiry appears to licence a specific form of dogmatism: once one knows the answer to a question, one ought to decline further evidence bearing on it. For, in knowing the answer to the question, one has already met the aim of inquiry. And by gathering further evidence one risks losing that knowledge by acquiring misleading evidence. After distinguishing the relevant form of dogmatism from standard dogmatism, I reject a range of different responses to this challenge including that gathering further evidence may answer alternative inquiries, the idea that the aim of inquiry is not knowledge but something stronger, or appeal to the personal aims of inquirers. Here I argue that none of these replies are adequate and instead suggest a solution that appeals to situation-sensitive epistemic norms on inquiry.</p>

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Knowledge, inquiry and dogmatism

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年4月10日

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  • Jessica Brown

摘要

The popular idea that knowledge is the aim of inquiry appears to licence a specific form of dogmatism: once one knows the answer to a question, one ought to decline further evidence bearing on it. For, in knowing the answer to the question, one has already met the aim of inquiry. And by gathering further evidence one risks losing that knowledge by acquiring misleading evidence. After distinguishing the relevant form of dogmatism from standard dogmatism, I reject a range of different responses to this challenge including that gathering further evidence may answer alternative inquiries, the idea that the aim of inquiry is not knowledge but something stronger, or appeal to the personal aims of inquirers. Here I argue that none of these replies are adequate and instead suggest a solution that appeals to situation-sensitive epistemic norms on inquiry.