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<p>According to the Doctrine of Normative Defeat (‘the DND’), you may lose justification to believe that <i>p</i> if you fail to possess negatively relevant evidence that you ought to possess. This paper presents an objection to the DND as it’s standardly developed: it carries with it an absurd implication regarding how one’s knowledge can be restored once one’s associated epistemic justification is presumed to be normatively defeated. I defend the force of this objection before closing with a note about what my argument means for the DND’s motivation.</p>

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Reconsidering normative defeat

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年4月18日

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  • Nate Lauffer

摘要

According to the Doctrine of Normative Defeat (‘the DND’), you may lose justification to believe that p if you fail to possess negatively relevant evidence that you ought to possess. This paper presents an objection to the DND as it’s standardly developed: it carries with it an absurd implication regarding how one’s knowledge can be restored once one’s associated epistemic justification is presumed to be normatively defeated. I defend the force of this objection before closing with a note about what my argument means for the DND’s motivation.