Radical ignorance and the Dunning–Kruger effect: an improved account of the logic involved
摘要
In a recent paper (Fano and Graziani in Synthese 199:601–616, 2021), a notion of radical ignorance is proposed, to formalize a notion of ignorance that is important for the epistemology of science. The authors of that paper correctly notice that misbelief is an important part of radical ignorance, but an adequate semantics of radical ignorance is absent. In the current paper, we introduce a form of ignorance, called ‘Dunning–Kruger ignorance’ (D–K ignorance hereafter). We demonstrate that the proposal of this notion is more suitable than that of radical ignorance, in that besides misbelief plays an important role in the notion as well, the D–K ignorance can express the important properties of the Dunning–Kruger effect. We study the logical properties of D–K ignorance alone, investigate the relationships between D–K ignorance and propositional knowledge, and compare this new form of ignorance with other existing forms of ignorance such as first-order ignorance, second-order ignorance and Rumsfeld ignorance in the literature. The main results include bisimulation, expressivity, axiomatizations and decidability.