Inferential potentials as lexical meanings
摘要
Drobňák and Kaluziński argue that normative inferentialism is an attractive theory of meaning, which can play an important part in the semantic minimalism—contextualism debate. In particular it can explain such phenomena as context-sensitivity, ambiguity and conversational implicatures. In what follows I’ll critically asses their approach, point out its weaknesses and suggest possible improvements and modifications. In Sect. 2 I take issue with some of the analyses of contextualists’ scenarios proposed by Kaluziński and offer a more uniform treatment. I also argue—pace Kaluziński and following Drobňák—that inferentialism is best seen as a variant of contextualism. In Sect. 3 I describe Drobňák’s approach to implicatures, homonymy and polysemy, whereas in Sect. 4 I analyze this approach in detail and indicate its shortcomings. I also suggest an alternative analysis of implicatures and an important modification of the way in which inferential significances are constructed. As far as I can see, my suggestions are in line with inferentialism’s spirit and could easily be incorporated within its framework.