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<p>A recent argument by Gillian Russell for logical nihilism raises fundamental questions about logic. Using expressions sensitive to some feature of their linguistic context (I call such expressions <i>referentially promiscuous</i> (Georgi <CitationRef CitationID="CR7">2015</CitationRef>, <CitationRef CitationID="CR8">2020</CitationRef>), Russell offers counterexamples to the simplest logical laws (Russel, <CitationRef CitationID="CR17">2017</CitationRef>, <CitationRef CitationID="CR18">2018</CitationRef>). Recent objections to Russell by Dicher (<CitationRef CitationID="CR3">2021</CitationRef>) and Haze (<CitationRef CitationID="CR10">2022</CitationRef>) have challenged her inclusion of referentially promiscuous expressions in instances of logical laws, but neither objection is wholly successful. The objections do, however, suggest a general strategy for objecting to Russell’s argument. In this paper I develop a version of this strategy into a successful objection according to which referential promiscuity is written into the laws of logic.</p>

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Logical nihilism in context, or referential promiscuity and logical form

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年4月2日

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  • Geoff Georgi

摘要

A recent argument by Gillian Russell for logical nihilism raises fundamental questions about logic. Using expressions sensitive to some feature of their linguistic context (I call such expressions referentially promiscuous (Georgi 2015, 2020), Russell offers counterexamples to the simplest logical laws (Russel, 2017, 2018). Recent objections to Russell by Dicher (2021) and Haze (2022) have challenged her inclusion of referentially promiscuous expressions in instances of logical laws, but neither objection is wholly successful. The objections do, however, suggest a general strategy for objecting to Russell’s argument. In this paper I develop a version of this strategy into a successful objection according to which referential promiscuity is written into the laws of logic.