<p>A knowledge-first starting point in epistemology has much to recommend it. However, a full picture of epistemic normativity cannot get by with just a knowledge norm. I have argued that the missing normative standard can be found by looking at the knowledge-conduciveness of the dispositions manifested by subjects when forming and retaining doxastic states. A doxastic state that falls short of knowledge can nevertheless be <i>reasonable</i> in virtue of being formed and retained by manifesting dispositions that are among the most knowledge-conducive feasible ones. Given a rather broad way of understanding consequentialism, my view is consequentialist, for reasonable belief is understood in terms of a kind of conduciveness to knowledge. However, several authors have argued that any form of consequentialism in epistemology faces an array of insurmountable objections. I consider three prominent objections: the problem of tradeoffs, the challenge of generalising a consequentialist norm to suspension of judgment, and variants of the so-called swamping problem. I argue that none have bite against my view.</p>