In analytic epistemology, the propositional ignorance of an agent is consistently defined in terms of an agent not having knowledge or true belief that something is the case. Recently, however, Piedrahita (2021) and Pritchard (2021) have argued that ignorance involves some kind of epistemic fault. Pritchard claims that ignorance is the product of an intellectual defect in the agent as an inquirer, whereas Piedrahita claims that ignorance involves an agent being in a certain kind of epistemically suboptimal position. This article uses willful ignorance in Anglo-American criminal law as a lens through which to assess these claims. First, I argue that willful ignorance is a counterexample to Piedrahita’s view of ignorance. Second, I argue that Pritchard’s view of ignorance illuminates the epistemic culpability of willful ignorance, but the view faces challenging questions about the relationship between epistemic norms and epistemic values.
