Perspectival realism and frequentist statistics: the case of Jerzy Neyman’s methodology and philosophy

In this article I investigate the extent to which perspectival realism (PR) agrees with frequentist statistical methodology and philosophy, with an emphasis on J. Neyman’s frequentist statistical methods and philosophy. PR is clarified in the context of frequentist statistics. Based on the example of the stopping rule problem, PR is shown to be able to naturally be associated with frequentist statistics in general. I show that there are explicit and implicit aspects of Neyman’s methods and philosophy that are incompatible and both partially agree and disagree with PR. Additionally, I provide clarifications and interpretations to make Neyman’s methods and philosophy more coherent with the realist aspect of PR. Furthermore, I deliver an argument that, based on Neyman’s methods and philosophy, one is dealing with genuine and non-trivial perspectives. I argue that, despite Neyman being a normative anti-pluralist, there are some elements of perspectival pluralism present in his methods and philosophy. In conclusion, firstly, due to their ambivalence, Neyman’s conceptions align more closely with PR than with alternative, less moderate stances. Secondly, from the perspective of the statistical approach analysed, PR should be treated as a descriptive rather than a normative position, and as case (or aspect)-dependent, rather than a universal, absolute, or binding stance.