<p>First, I argue that some phenomenological theory of pleasure and displeasure must be true because purely attitudinal theories cannot explain cases of hedonic change. Specifically, when we introspect a pleasant sensation becoming unpleasant, there is a radical change in what it is like to be us. Since this change cannot be explained in terms of changes in any nonhedonic phenomenal character, (dis)pleasures have a particular phenomenal character. I then argue for a version of the distinctive feeling theory I call the evaluative qualia view. It says (dis)pleasures are experiences that instantiate evaluative phenomenal properties. I support this view in two ways. First, I argue on the basis of introspective considerations that (dis)pleasures are unified in that they have an evaluative phenomenal character; they feel good or bad. Then, I argue this evaluative character should be understood in terms of determinate phenomenal properties rather than “aspects” of such properties or determinables. Finally, I answer some objections against the view, including the heterogeneity objection and the implausibility of having (dis)pleasure while being indifferent to them.</p>