Reflexive awareness and reflexivity: an identity model of reflexive awareness with Korta and Perry’s reflexive-referential theory of content (RRT)

In recent years, much debate has centered on the same-order representational theory of consciousness. According to this theory, (1) conscious mental episodes are episodes of which we are aware; and (2) the awareness of an external object and the immediate, reflexive awareness of the mental episode together constitute a single episode. In this paper, I propose that the reflexive-referential theory of content developed by Korta and Perry can be used to establish the claim that reflexive awareness is numerically identical to the mental episode it represents. The advantage of this model is threefold. First, it avoids misrepresentation and vicious infinite regress. Second, it illustrates the intimate connection between a mental episode and the reflexive awareness of it. Third, it explains why consciousness is an intrinsic property.