<p>This article offers a critical analysis of David Dubrovsky’s theory of consciousness, which is presented as materialist and non-reductionist. Dubrovsky claims to resolve the hard problem of consciousness by introducing the notion of ‘subjective reality’, which he treats as a specific form of informational process implemented in the brain. However, a close examination reveals that his theory does not address phenomenal consciousness. Instead, subjective experience is reinterpreted through a functionalist lens and operationalized in terms of observable, reportable, and behaviorally relevant states. Drawing on Dubrovsky’s early polemic with Evald Ilyenkov the article reconstructs the genealogy of Dubrovsky’s commitments: the subordination of philosophy to science, the rejection of metaphysical subjectivity, and the naturalistic reduction of meaning to neural dynamics. The paper argues that key concepts in Dubrovsky’s theory—including ‘consciousness’, ‘information’, and ‘the ideal’—undergo semantic shifts that make genuine philosophical dialogue with analytic theories impossible. Although Dubrovsky often employs the terminology of contemporary philosophy of mind, his use of these terms masks a deeper conceptual incompatibility: where analytic philosophers are concerned with the qualitative structure of experience, Dubrovsky focuses exclusively on informational functions and their neurodynamic correlates. The article concludes that Dubrovsky’s theory fails to offer a coherent answer to the hard problem. By conflating explanatory levels and avoiding the question of phenomenality, it reproduces the very dualism it seeks to overcome. Rather than engaging the philosophy of mind on its own terms, Dubrovsky displaces its central concerns—resulting not in dialogue, but in a structurally impossible exchange between incommensurable discourses.</p>