<p>In this paper, I critically address Dugin’s interpretation of Heidegger, specifically his conviction that Heidegger’s fundamental ontology can be transformed into “fundamental anthropology” and that the notion of <i>Dasein</i> can be reformulated as “Russian” <i>Dasein</i>. First, I argue that this attempt is clearly inconsistent with Heidegger’s perspective. Dugin’s effort to locate anthropological differences at the level of “existentials,” i.e., necessary structures that enable Dasein’s understanding of Being, runs counter to the basic meaning of Heidegger’s early project. Second, I also argue that Dugin’s approach is incapable of accounting for culturally distinct, contingent community, offering instead a clearly anti-cultural imperialistic logic of expansion that only employs cultural clichés in order to impose homogeneity across the subordinated individuals. This attempt remains non-Heideggerian in spirit; it also relies on the traditional metaphysical understanding of Being. I finish the paper by offering an alternative proposal for how we could account for something like “cultural Dasein,” a culturally situated understanding of Being that is linked to a contingently existing community, through a reconsideration of the rigid distinction between the existential and existentiel levels of analysis.</p>

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Russian Dasein: Dugin’s reading of Heidegger and the possibility of “cultural Dasein”

  • Daniil Koloskov

摘要

In this paper, I critically address Dugin’s interpretation of Heidegger, specifically his conviction that Heidegger’s fundamental ontology can be transformed into “fundamental anthropology” and that the notion of Dasein can be reformulated as “Russian” Dasein. First, I argue that this attempt is clearly inconsistent with Heidegger’s perspective. Dugin’s effort to locate anthropological differences at the level of “existentials,” i.e., necessary structures that enable Dasein’s understanding of Being, runs counter to the basic meaning of Heidegger’s early project. Second, I also argue that Dugin’s approach is incapable of accounting for culturally distinct, contingent community, offering instead a clearly anti-cultural imperialistic logic of expansion that only employs cultural clichés in order to impose homogeneity across the subordinated individuals. This attempt remains non-Heideggerian in spirit; it also relies on the traditional metaphysical understanding of Being. I finish the paper by offering an alternative proposal for how we could account for something like “cultural Dasein,” a culturally situated understanding of Being that is linked to a contingently existing community, through a reconsideration of the rigid distinction between the existential and existentiel levels of analysis.