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<p>In my article, I reconstruct the main points of Alexey G. Chernyakov’s interpretation of Kant’s philosophy. For this purpose, I chose four topics of Kantian philosophy significant for him: (1) Kant’s thesis about being, (2) Kant’s doctrine of the original unity of apperception (the transcendental subject), (3) Kant’s doctrine of transcendental schematism, and, finally, (4) Kant’s contribution to the shaping of the idea of philosophical anthropology. The goal of this approach is to detect both the role of Kant’s intellectual heritage in Chernyakov’s philosophy and the latter’s views on Kant’s place in the history of (transcendental) philosophy. In my paper, I argue that (although it is not so obvious in the works of Chernyakov himself) the last-mentioned topic is the most fundamental, and the rest of them have it as their basis. To be more concrete, Chernyakov connects Kant’s role in the shaping of the idea of philosophical anthropology with Kantian conceptions of freedom and moral action, which are the basis of philosophy as a whole in Kant. Grounding this point, Chernyakov refers to Heidegger’s interpretations of Kant’s thought. According to Heidegger, since Kant reduced all the philosophical issues to the question “What is man?” he was the key person in the history of the shaping of anthropological attitude in modern philosophy. But it is precisely the noumenal freedom and capacity of moral action that are the most proper ontological features of the human being. Heidegger, this way, rethinks both fundamental Kantian notions—freedom and moral action—in the ontological context of his own philosophy. These concepts are the heart of the philosophy of Alexey Chernyakov himself as well. As a result, I conclude that this is the reason why Chernyakov most often compares Kant’s philosophy with that of Heidegger. To be more precise, he considers the Heideggerian ontology as (in his own terms) a “negative analogy” of Kantian philosophy. In Chernyakov’s view, Heidegger transferred the basic notions of Kant in his ontology, expanding their contents through the negating of their Kantian definitions limited by the framework of the metaphysics of presence.</p>

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The Reception of Immanuel Kant’s Philosophy in the Work of Alexey G. Chernyakov

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年6月25日

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  • Andrei Patkul

摘要

In my article, I reconstruct the main points of Alexey G. Chernyakov’s interpretation of Kant’s philosophy. For this purpose, I chose four topics of Kantian philosophy significant for him: (1) Kant’s thesis about being, (2) Kant’s doctrine of the original unity of apperception (the transcendental subject), (3) Kant’s doctrine of transcendental schematism, and, finally, (4) Kant’s contribution to the shaping of the idea of philosophical anthropology. The goal of this approach is to detect both the role of Kant’s intellectual heritage in Chernyakov’s philosophy and the latter’s views on Kant’s place in the history of (transcendental) philosophy. In my paper, I argue that (although it is not so obvious in the works of Chernyakov himself) the last-mentioned topic is the most fundamental, and the rest of them have it as their basis. To be more concrete, Chernyakov connects Kant’s role in the shaping of the idea of philosophical anthropology with Kantian conceptions of freedom and moral action, which are the basis of philosophy as a whole in Kant. Grounding this point, Chernyakov refers to Heidegger’s interpretations of Kant’s thought. According to Heidegger, since Kant reduced all the philosophical issues to the question “What is man?” he was the key person in the history of the shaping of anthropological attitude in modern philosophy. But it is precisely the noumenal freedom and capacity of moral action that are the most proper ontological features of the human being. Heidegger, this way, rethinks both fundamental Kantian notions—freedom and moral action—in the ontological context of his own philosophy. These concepts are the heart of the philosophy of Alexey Chernyakov himself as well. As a result, I conclude that this is the reason why Chernyakov most often compares Kant’s philosophy with that of Heidegger. To be more precise, he considers the Heideggerian ontology as (in his own terms) a “negative analogy” of Kantian philosophy. In Chernyakov’s view, Heidegger transferred the basic notions of Kant in his ontology, expanding their contents through the negating of their Kantian definitions limited by the framework of the metaphysics of presence.