Value Pluralism and the International Criminal Court: A Legal-Philosophical Inquiry into the Erosion of a Shared Normative Horizon
摘要
This article offers a legal-philosophical reflection on the contemporary transformation of value pluralism within Western constitutional and international legal orders. After reconstructing the historical institutionalization of pluralism as a regulatory paradigm of democratic coexistence in the second half of the twentieth century, the paper argues that pluralism today survives predominantly at a semantic level, while its normative and regulatory force is increasingly weakened in practice. The analysis identifies international criminal law—and particularly the activity of the International Criminal Court—as a paradigmatic site where this regressive shift becomes especially visible. The ICC embodies the universalistic ambition of pluralism by translating the protection of dignity, equality and humanity into coercive legal mechanisms capable of limiting sovereign power. Yet recent political contestations, selective cooperation, and acts of institutional and personal delegitimization directed against the Court reveal a growing tension between universal legal commitments and strategic assertions of sovereignty. The article contends that what is at stake is not merely the functional fragility of international criminal justice, but a deeper erosion of pluralism as a shared normative horizon. In this context, the role of the jurist becomes crucial: neither passive technician nor ideological actor, the jurist is called upon to maintain a critical awareness of how law mediates—or fails to mediate—asymmetrical conflicts of value in an increasingly polarized global order.