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<p>This article argues that the best remedy for the structural flaws of law (its unavoidable generality and its vulnerability to manipulation) is judicial practical wisdom (<i>phronesis</i>), understood both as an individual virtue and as an institutional quality. To illustrate this idea, the article refers to Lon L. Fuller’s “grudge informer” thought experiment and to Poland’s post-1989 lustration process, where conflicts between the letter and the spirit of the law revealed the danger of arbitrariness. The discussion then introduces virtue jurisprudence and reconstructs the ideal of <i>phronesis</i> as the quality judges need to deliver substantively just decisions. This ideal involves reflexivity and self-awareness, moral perception and imagination, empathy guided by reason, emotional self-control, and moral depth. The critical section addresses three common objections to a wisdom-based model of adjudication: first, that tacit moral judgment cannot be adequately communicated; second, that it encourages moral elitism; and third, that it leads to juristocracy, understood as law without rules. The article argues that these concerns can be mitigated by linking individual&#xa0;<i>phronesis</i>&#xa0;to its collective form. Drawing on Kristján Kristjánsson’s account of collective&#xa0;<i>phronesis</i>, it shows that the ethos of the judicial community—its body of precedents, standards of justification, practices of mutual critique, and moral exemplars—does not replace individual <i>phronesis</i> but rather strengthens, refines, and legitimizes it. The article concludes that grounding judicial wisdom in both the individual and the community strengthens the integration of the law’s letter and spirit, thereby us improving the quality and public legitimacy of adjudication.</p>

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Enhancing Practical Wisdom as an Antidote to Flawed Law: Individual Phronesis within Judicial Practice

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  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年5月6日

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  • Natasza Szutta

摘要

This article argues that the best remedy for the structural flaws of law (its unavoidable generality and its vulnerability to manipulation) is judicial practical wisdom (phronesis), understood both as an individual virtue and as an institutional quality. To illustrate this idea, the article refers to Lon L. Fuller’s “grudge informer” thought experiment and to Poland’s post-1989 lustration process, where conflicts between the letter and the spirit of the law revealed the danger of arbitrariness. The discussion then introduces virtue jurisprudence and reconstructs the ideal of phronesis as the quality judges need to deliver substantively just decisions. This ideal involves reflexivity and self-awareness, moral perception and imagination, empathy guided by reason, emotional self-control, and moral depth. The critical section addresses three common objections to a wisdom-based model of adjudication: first, that tacit moral judgment cannot be adequately communicated; second, that it encourages moral elitism; and third, that it leads to juristocracy, understood as law without rules. The article argues that these concerns can be mitigated by linking individual phronesis to its collective form. Drawing on Kristján Kristjánsson’s account of collective phronesis, it shows that the ethos of the judicial community—its body of precedents, standards of justification, practices of mutual critique, and moral exemplars—does not replace individual phronesis but rather strengthens, refines, and legitimizes it. The article concludes that grounding judicial wisdom in both the individual and the community strengthens the integration of the law’s letter and spirit, thereby us improving the quality and public legitimacy of adjudication.