<p>This paper investigates the epistemic crisis at the heart of algorithmic legal automation, arguing that the threat posed by artificial intelligence is not merely technological, but semiotic and philosophical. Drawing on Baudrillard’s theory of simulation [3] and Derrida’s concept of undecidability [10], the paper contends that algorithmic systems erode the symbolic structure of law by displacing ambiguity, interpretation, and hesitation—elements essential to justice. Through a semiotic analysis of algorithmic collusion and predictive legal systems, the work reframes automation as a revelation of law’s own citational fragility. Rather than a glitch, the algorithm is a mirror exposing law’s mimetic foundations. Against this backdrop, the paper calls for a post-anthropocentric jurisprudence that preserves the interpretive rupture essential to law’s ethical force. It is not the precision of the machine, but its inability to hesitate, that makes it incompatible with justice.</p>