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<p>This article’s primary objectives are twofold. The first is to analyse and compare how terms associated with dynamic interpretation operate in the jurisprudence of Spain and Poland. In the process, it will be demonstrated how courts may avoid such terminology while still applying methods typically described as ‘dynamic.’ The second objective is to assess whether dynamicity is an inherent feature of legal interpretation or merely one possible approach. The study draws on over 3,200 judicial decisions handed down by Polish and Spanish courts where interpretation was adapted to changing circumstances, or where terms such as dynamic, evolutionary, or sociological interpretation appeared. The findings show that these expressions are often linked to varied legal principles and lack precision in judicial usage. Moreover, contrary to common assumptions, labels such as <i>dynamic interpretation</i> are frequently used in contexts that do not involve or otherwise denote significant external change. The paper argues that legal interpretation is inherently dynamic and that so-called <i>static interpretation</i>, understood as a fixed and unchanging meaning, does not constitute a distinct and equally accepted method. However, it does not follow that extreme static theories are not genuinely advocated or that static reasoning lacks relevance. On the contrary, static approaches may serve as important exceptions that protect key democratic values. The analysis focuses on statutory interpretation, which has received far less scholarly attention in debates on dynamic and static approaches, having long been centred on constitutional law.</p>

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Does Static Interpretation Exist? Ways of Understanding and Applying Dynamic and Static Approaches to Statutory Interpretation in Polish and Spanish Case Law

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年8月8日

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  • Paulina Konca

摘要

This article’s primary objectives are twofold. The first is to analyse and compare how terms associated with dynamic interpretation operate in the jurisprudence of Spain and Poland. In the process, it will be demonstrated how courts may avoid such terminology while still applying methods typically described as ‘dynamic.’ The second objective is to assess whether dynamicity is an inherent feature of legal interpretation or merely one possible approach. The study draws on over 3,200 judicial decisions handed down by Polish and Spanish courts where interpretation was adapted to changing circumstances, or where terms such as dynamic, evolutionary, or sociological interpretation appeared. The findings show that these expressions are often linked to varied legal principles and lack precision in judicial usage. Moreover, contrary to common assumptions, labels such as dynamic interpretation are frequently used in contexts that do not involve or otherwise denote significant external change. The paper argues that legal interpretation is inherently dynamic and that so-called static interpretation, understood as a fixed and unchanging meaning, does not constitute a distinct and equally accepted method. However, it does not follow that extreme static theories are not genuinely advocated or that static reasoning lacks relevance. On the contrary, static approaches may serve as important exceptions that protect key democratic values. The analysis focuses on statutory interpretation, which has received far less scholarly attention in debates on dynamic and static approaches, having long been centred on constitutional law.