Against Exclusionary Reasons as Only Razian Facts

Legal rules are often understood in terms of exclusionary reasons, and exclusionary reasons are normally understood as reasons for action according to Raz. In this paper, I engage with the literature on the metaphysics of reasons for action and explain how exclusionary reasons can be used in different conceptions of what reasons for action are (and not only by the one defended by Joseph Raz). To do that, I proceed as follows: In the first part, and after differentiating between factual and psychological conceptions of what reasons for action are, I engage with different approaches to reasons for action as facts (such as those claiming that reasons are explanation or evidence of “oughts”, primitive facts, and value-based instrumental and non-instrumental facts) to defend that exclusionary reasons can be accommodated inside all of those factual conceptions of reasons for action. In the second part, I engage with those claiming that reasons for action are grounded in mental states (such as will, desires, beliefs, and intentions) to explore whether exclusionary reasons can work inside those psychological conceptions of what reasons for action are. As a result, by showing how exclusionary reasons can be accommodated inside different factual and psychological conceptions of what reasons for action are, I defend that exclusionary reasons are an open concept that is not conceptually linked to Raz’s conception of what reasons for action are.