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<p>This paper uses a historical case study of the American meatpacking industry to examine how rent-seeking entrepreneurship can harm environmental outcomes. We first show that Chicago’s largest meatpackers simultaneously reduced pollution and their production costs through innovative by-product utilization. We then demonstrate how these successes provoked rent-seeking behavior from less efficient competitors who pressured policymakers into dismantling the system of industrial organization created by the Chicago meatpackers. Our analysis reveals that rent-seeking behavior can obstruct market-based innovations that promote sustainability. We outline a novel causal model in which rent-seeking actively undermines the capacity of private-sector initiatives to improve environmental outcomes. Our findings challenge some of the dominant assumptions in the environmental policy, management studies, and circular economy literatures. We suggest that profit-seeking entrepreneurship in a regime of competitive and lightly regulated markets may, at least in some circumstances, deliver superior environmental results compared to management by elected officials.</p>

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Does rent-seeking entrepreneurship hurt the environment? Historical insights from the US meatpacking industry

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

    开放获取

  • 发表日期：

    2026年7月4日

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  • Pierre Desrochers,
  • Andrew Smith

摘要

This paper uses a historical case study of the American meatpacking industry to examine how rent-seeking entrepreneurship can harm environmental outcomes. We first show that Chicago’s largest meatpackers simultaneously reduced pollution and their production costs through innovative by-product utilization. We then demonstrate how these successes provoked rent-seeking behavior from less efficient competitors who pressured policymakers into dismantling the system of industrial organization created by the Chicago meatpackers. Our analysis reveals that rent-seeking behavior can obstruct market-based innovations that promote sustainability. We outline a novel causal model in which rent-seeking actively undermines the capacity of private-sector initiatives to improve environmental outcomes. Our findings challenge some of the dominant assumptions in the environmental policy, management studies, and circular economy literatures. We suggest that profit-seeking entrepreneurship in a regime of competitive and lightly regulated markets may, at least in some circumstances, deliver superior environmental results compared to management by elected officials.