<p>This paper responds to the dilemma of affective injustice by distinguishing between three forms of anger and recommending a model of virtuous anger the expression of which is consistent with the productive pursuit of justice. It argues that anger may in the first instance be either passive or active, that is, a passive affective register and morally inert experience, or something that is manifest in action towards other agents. Active anger may then be grounded in moral norms, or not. Anger that is properly grounded and guided by morality is consistent with virtuous agency and the productive pursuit of moral ends. In constructing this model of anger we draw inspiration from the Kantian account of virtue. We argue that this model provides a sound structure for morally productive anger while remaining vigilant towards anger’s darker possibilities. To demonstrate the comparative strength of this model, we outline some challenges with the idea of apt anger, arguing that moral norms and constraints are better suited to guide our evaluation of anger. We apply this model to educational settings, where we argue that it is beneficial to channel anger through moral norms, rather than attempt to calibrate its proper magnitude. All things considered, the moral status of anger is equivocal: it can both aid and hinder the pursuit of justice, so it is best to take a cautious while permissive stance towards its use in our common life.</p>