<p>David Benatar’s asymmetry argument for anti-natalism has been a subject of long-standing scrutiny. I shall focus on a crucial yet surprisingly overlooked structural flaw in his use of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) arguments. Benatar’s argument begins with the procreation asymmetry, which implies that some procreative cases are morally wrong, whereas others are not. He then concludes with anti-natalism, which asserts that all procreative cases in the real world are morally wrong. This leads to a problematic overlap between the cases in the premises and those in the conclusion, resulting in conflicting moral judgments. I shall argue that this conflicting overlap renders the argument untenable as an IBE. This flaw in the inferential structure has complicated the debate, particularly by making it difficult for critics to effectively refute his argument. Although anti-natalist arguments could, in principle, utilize IBE, Benatar’s original attempt to develop contemporary anti-natalism fails to adhere to the fundamental rules of IBE arguments. This paper aims to clarify the issues with Benatar’s foundational approach and to suggest directions for future exploration of anti-natalism.</p>