<p>In this paper I formulate three objections to Axel Gosseries’s account of what we owe to future generations when it comes to addressing problems related to climate change. First, I challenge Gosseries’s use of the term justice, quite generally, to apply to both human-induced as well as to natural, that is, non-human-induced, detrimental effects. I argue that this liberal use of the term justice constructs a view that implausibly lacks reference to human agency. Second, I challenge the way Gosseries applies the notion of distributive justice, more specifically, across generations. I show that he makes use of this notion too indiscriminately, as if principles of distributive justice simply applied between humans across time and space, regardless of whether they stand in any relationship of cooperation to each other. Third, I reject the claim that our concern with justice <i>across</i> generations should persuade us not to save for the future if those who are worst-off across time—and who can be “reached” by transfers—are among the currently living. I suggest that there may be value connected to saving for the future for all concerned, including the presently worst-off. Saving therefore does not necessarily directly compete with the duty to maximize the position of the worst-off, wherever in time they may be situated.</p>