Uncontrolled Power: Independence and Markets in Republicanism

This paper discusses three theses of the neo-republican analysis of the market. According to the first, one of the advantages of the market is its impersonality, meaning that no one needs to be tied to others because there are multiple possible partners. If freedom is identified with the lack of personal dependence on the uncontrolled power of third parties, then the market promotes free and horizontal relations. According to the second thesis, market exchanges have something distinctive to preserve freedom because they allow participants to operate through offers instead of penalties. The paper examines various possible meanings of ‘dependence' and ‘independence' and argues, against the traditional interpretation, that personal dependence and penalties are significant aspects but not necessary conditions for domination. We can be exposed to uncontrolled power, thus to domination, even if we have multiple partners to turn to and without anyone being able to threaten or penalise us into accepting a deal. Finally, the third thesis asserts that market competition can nullify domination. The paper argues that domination could exist even with perfect competition. Nevertheless, it concludes by claiming that while we cannot take the three discussed arguments at face value, we must recognise their grain of truth. The market could disperse decision-making capacity, generating new opportunities and efficiency; however, to put it in a slogan: no decentralisation suffices without the effective dispersion of power.