<p>This paper examines how organizational capital (OC) influences corporate debt pricing and financing choices across both syndicated loans and public bonds. Using a panel of U.S. firms from 2000–2016, we find that higher OC lowers borrowing costs in both markets, with a substantially stronger effect in public bonds. Firms with strong OC are also more likely to issue bonds rather than borrow from banks, indicating that public debt investors are especially responsive to the risk‐mitigating features of OC. Whereas prior research, including Danielova et al. (2023), has focused solely on syndicated loans, our study is the first to document that OC is actively priced by public bond investors. The effect is concentrated in investment‐grade and senior secured bonds, where creditor protections are strongest, and is absent in high‐yield and subordinated debt. These patterns support a creditor‐protection channel that complements information‐transparency and rating mechanisms. By jointly analyzing private and public debt markets, we show that OC is systematically rewarded when creditor incentives are aligned and monitoring is effective.</p>

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Organizational capital and debt pricing: evidence from bank loans and public bonds

  • Alice Hsieh,
  • Cheng-Few Lee,
  • Hai-Chin Yu

摘要

This paper examines how organizational capital (OC) influences corporate debt pricing and financing choices across both syndicated loans and public bonds. Using a panel of U.S. firms from 2000–2016, we find that higher OC lowers borrowing costs in both markets, with a substantially stronger effect in public bonds. Firms with strong OC are also more likely to issue bonds rather than borrow from banks, indicating that public debt investors are especially responsive to the risk‐mitigating features of OC. Whereas prior research, including Danielova et al. (2023), has focused solely on syndicated loans, our study is the first to document that OC is actively priced by public bond investors. The effect is concentrated in investment‐grade and senior secured bonds, where creditor protections are strongest, and is absent in high‐yield and subordinated debt. These patterns support a creditor‐protection channel that complements information‐transparency and rating mechanisms. By jointly analyzing private and public debt markets, we show that OC is systematically rewarded when creditor incentives are aligned and monitoring is effective.