<p>According to “hinge epistemology”, our worldviews are shaped by “hinges”: certainties, assumptions, or commitments that have a “framework” function and are therefore beyond epistemic evaluation. Recently, some scholars have suggested that religious hinges are unique kinds of hinges, or that there is something distinct about the application of hinge epistemology to religious contexts. Taking inspiration from these proposals, the essay explores the relationship between religion and hinge epistemology, with the ultimate aim of determining whether the above-mentioned claim is justified. I focus primarily on two arguments: the idea that religious hinges involve a unique doxastic attitude of faith; and the idea that religious hinges are the outcome of a uniquely religious mental faculty (a <i>sensus divinitatis</i>). I reject both claims: the former is based on a misunderstanding of the varieties of hinges; and regarding the latter, we have no non-religious reasons to believe that a <i>sensus divinitatis</i> exists. Overall, the development of a uniquely religious hinge epistemology seems unlikely, whether we base our claim on content, form, or process. I close the essay by drawing some consequences for religious “hinge disagreements”. On a more optimistic note, I also suggest a new avenue for research that emerges from my analysis, and that hinge epistemologists interested in religion, spirituality, and related matters have, so far, not considered.</p>