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<p>Pascal’s Wager has generated persistent decision-theoretic objections—many-gods symmetry, policy indeterminacy, prior arbitrariness, and infinite-utility pathologies—that resist resolution despite sophisticated refinements. This article diagnoses these objections as symptoms of a shared presupposition: the <i>neutral calculator</i>, a supposed context-transcendent standpoint from which all religious options can be compared on a single decision matrix. Drawing on Wittgenstein’s forms of life, Austin’s felicity conditions, and Ryle’s category-mistake analysis, I argue that positing such a standpoint constitutes a category mistake. Religious evaluation necessarily occurs within practices that give determinate meaning to concepts like salvation, belief, and infinite reward. From this diagnosis, I develop the principle of <i>Background-Conditioned Rationality</i> (BCR), which holds that rational assessment must be conducted within the background that confers sense on its evaluative tokens. Applying BCR dissolves the standard objections by showing they demand an impossible standpoint. The article clarifies Pascal’s original project as situated pastoral counsel rather than neutral arbitration, and indicates how inter-religious dialogue can proceed without the mythical <i>neutral calculator</i>. This diagnosis explains why technical solutions generate endless counter-objections. They attempt to solve practice-constituted problems from a practice-transcendent standpoint.</p>

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Pascal’s wager and the myth of the neutral calculator

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年3月9日

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  • Xiaoyang Wang

摘要

Pascal’s Wager has generated persistent decision-theoretic objections—many-gods symmetry, policy indeterminacy, prior arbitrariness, and infinite-utility pathologies—that resist resolution despite sophisticated refinements. This article diagnoses these objections as symptoms of a shared presupposition: the neutral calculator, a supposed context-transcendent standpoint from which all religious options can be compared on a single decision matrix. Drawing on Wittgenstein’s forms of life, Austin’s felicity conditions, and Ryle’s category-mistake analysis, I argue that positing such a standpoint constitutes a category mistake. Religious evaluation necessarily occurs within practices that give determinate meaning to concepts like salvation, belief, and infinite reward. From this diagnosis, I develop the principle of Background-Conditioned Rationality (BCR), which holds that rational assessment must be conducted within the background that confers sense on its evaluative tokens. Applying BCR dissolves the standard objections by showing they demand an impossible standpoint. The article clarifies Pascal’s original project as situated pastoral counsel rather than neutral arbitration, and indicates how inter-religious dialogue can proceed without the mythical neutral calculator. This diagnosis explains why technical solutions generate endless counter-objections. They attempt to solve practice-constituted problems from a practice-transcendent standpoint.