<p>Schellenberg’s argument from divine hiddenness is one of the most widely discussed arguments for atheism in contemporary literature. This article develops new responses to Schellenberg’s argument which start with elucidating and refuting his theological assumptions concerning the concept of ‘God’. By considering the atheists’ commitment to the claim that there is no Creator of the universe (regardless of whether this Creator is perfectly loving or not), this article proposes a strategy that begins with this bare conception of God which (together with other arguments) can then be used to rebut Schellenberg’s argument against Perfect Being Theism. In particular, it is shown that Schellenberg misconstrues his Divine Hiddenness Argument as an argument against the existence of God, and that he has failed to demonstrate that there is no good argument for the existence of God. Based on these and other considerations, I show that there are good reasons to be skeptical that one can demonstrate the existence of non-resistant nonbelievers and (even if there are) that God has no good reason for delaying the starting of relationship with them. Thus, the Divine Hiddenness Argument fails.</p>

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On the concept of ‘God’ and Schellenberg’s divine hiddenness argument

  • Andrew Ter Ern Loke

摘要

Schellenberg’s argument from divine hiddenness is one of the most widely discussed arguments for atheism in contemporary literature. This article develops new responses to Schellenberg’s argument which start with elucidating and refuting his theological assumptions concerning the concept of ‘God’. By considering the atheists’ commitment to the claim that there is no Creator of the universe (regardless of whether this Creator is perfectly loving or not), this article proposes a strategy that begins with this bare conception of God which (together with other arguments) can then be used to rebut Schellenberg’s argument against Perfect Being Theism. In particular, it is shown that Schellenberg misconstrues his Divine Hiddenness Argument as an argument against the existence of God, and that he has failed to demonstrate that there is no good argument for the existence of God. Based on these and other considerations, I show that there are good reasons to be skeptical that one can demonstrate the existence of non-resistant nonbelievers and (even if there are) that God has no good reason for delaying the starting of relationship with them. Thus, the Divine Hiddenness Argument fails.