Structural evil from coordination trap: a game-theoretic account of the distribution of evil
摘要
This paper examines the Problem of the Distribution of Evil (PODE): why serious harms tend to cluster rather than spread evenly. Building on the idea that much suffering is socially structured and focusing on assurance games such as Stag Hunt, we define Structural Evil as the pattern of harm that arises from risk-dominant coordination traps, where harmful behavior becomes the “safe” choice under uncertainty. We suggest that these structural dynamics often sustain, concentrate, and amplify a wide range of evils, helping to explain observed clustering. In response to James Sterba’s prevention challenge, we argue that routine miraculous “rescues” by God would disrupt coordination and ultimately cause more harm than they prevent. Guided by a Non-Manipulative Intervention Constraint (NMIC), we propose an information-centered toolkit, including truthful public signals, credible joint commitments, neutral monitoring, and shared focal practices, that aligns expectations and makes mutual cooperation the safest strategy for each agent. According to this view, subtle epistemic guidance—reorganizing the informational environment—can enable God to prevent many harms while maintaining human agency and dignity.