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<p>There is an underexplored puzzle in the philosophy of religion that presents a <i>prima facie</i> reason to believe God does not exist: the problem of blameless moral ignorance. If God is omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect, then he would desire and ensure that all non-blameable rational agents have sufficient moral knowledge to act rightly. Yet cases of sincere moral ignorance persist. Drawing on a recent formulation of this problem by Elbert (Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8:32, 2022), this paper proceeds in three stages. First, I critique Elbert’s argument by identifying unsupported theological and epistemic assumptions. Second, I develop a more defensible version of the argument that better aligns with its underlying commitments. Third, I evaluate the revised argument and argue that, even in its improved form, the challenge fails to demonstrate that God does not exist. In the end, I draw out an implication of this discussion for understanding moral knowledge within a theistic framework: not as a static set of propositions to be disclosed, but as a process of moral transformation and discovery.</p>

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Moral knowledge and epistemic limits: a theistic framework for understanding blameless ignorance

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年9月6日

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  • Hunter Kallay

摘要

There is an underexplored puzzle in the philosophy of religion that presents a prima facie reason to believe God does not exist: the problem of blameless moral ignorance. If God is omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect, then he would desire and ensure that all non-blameable rational agents have sufficient moral knowledge to act rightly. Yet cases of sincere moral ignorance persist. Drawing on a recent formulation of this problem by Elbert (Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8:32, 2022), this paper proceeds in three stages. First, I critique Elbert’s argument by identifying unsupported theological and epistemic assumptions. Second, I develop a more defensible version of the argument that better aligns with its underlying commitments. Third, I evaluate the revised argument and argue that, even in its improved form, the challenge fails to demonstrate that God does not exist. In the end, I draw out an implication of this discussion for understanding moral knowledge within a theistic framework: not as a static set of propositions to be disclosed, but as a process of moral transformation and discovery.